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NOTE AND COMMENT 
CoNSTITUTION.ALITY OF TH:i;: LA For.r.r:TTr: AMENDMENT 'ro THS !NTERNAI. 
lliWr:NW LAW OF 1921.-The United States Senate on November 5, 1921, 
inserted in the Revenue Act, then before the Senate, a provision that tax-
payers in their income tax returns must specify what state and municipal 
bonds they hold, or else be subject to a penalty of five per cent. That pro-
vision was dropped out in conference, but it will come up again, and it is 
well to look at its constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches. 
Doubtless any reasonable requirements in a tax report, so as to show 
what tax shall be paid. may be enacted by Congress. Thus the supreme 
court of Connecticut has held (Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 
94 Conn. 47, affirmed 254 U. S. n3, but not involving this point) that a 
state in levying ·an income tax on foreign corporations doing business in 
the state may require them to file with the state tax authorities a copy of 
their federal income tax returns. 
But that is an entirely different proposition from a requirement that 
shall give information as to matters not bearirtg on the tax. Income from 
state or municipal bonds is not taxable by the federal government, and hence 
the federal income tax reports have nothing whatsoever to do with income 
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from state or municipal bonds. The inquiry is not pertinent, and hence the 
proposed requirement looks like an impertinent prying into private affairs. 
Constitutional law will not tolerate that. The Supreme Court in the case 
of Kilboum v. Thomps01i, 103 U. S. 168, said (page 190): "We are sure 
that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either 
House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House 
has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these 
bodies possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs 
of the citizen." Even in an investigation by the United States Senate as to 
whether any Senators had speculated in stocks, the value of which would 
be affected by pending legislation, the Supreme Court, while holding that a 
witness must answer questions (Re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 667), said that 
the Act of Congress relative to compelling witnesses to answer "refers to 
matters within the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Congress, before them 
for consideration and proper for their action; to questions pertinent thereto; 
and to facts or papers bearing thereon." The Supreme Court in Interstate 
Com. Com. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 478, approved the Kilboitm decision 
to the effect that "Neither branch of the legislative department, still less 
any merely administrative body, established by Congress, ·possesses, or can 
be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs 
of the citizen." The court also approved the statement of Jaw of Mr. Justice 
Field in Re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241, 250, that "of all 
the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential 
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that 
involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption 
of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny 
of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half 
their value." In the Matter of Eames, 204 N. Y. 108, where a witness before 
a legislative committee refused to answer questions in regard to his hold· 
ings of stock in a certain corporation, the court pointed out that the New 
York Code of Civil Procedure provision limited the questions to those 
which were "pertinent." When the Interstate Commerce Commission asked 
Mr. Harriman about his purchases of stock, and he refused to answer, the 
Supreme Court upheld him, and said in regard to the power of investigation 
claimed by the Commission, "No such unlimited command over the liberty 
of all citizens ever was given, so far as we know, in constitutional times, 
to any commission or court." Harriman v. Interstate Com. Com., 2II U. S. 
407. The latest decision of the Supreme Court as to an individual's private 
papers is Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 2g8, decided February 28, 1921. 
There the court held that the private papers obtained by a government rep-
resentative from the office of a person under pretense of a friendly call 
during his absence is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, 
and such papers cannot under the Fifth Amendment be used to convict him 
of a crime. The court further held that a search warrant is proper only 
to obtain papers to prevent injury to the public from their use and not 
merely to obtain them as evidence against a defendant. The court said 
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(page 304) : "It has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should 
receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encr.oachment upon 
or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible 
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous execu-
tive officers." The act of a man's wife in allowing government officers to 
enter his home without a warrant, but on their demand for admission, to 
make a search for liquor held in violation of the revenue laws, is unconsti-
tutional, under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Amos v. United 
States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921). It is true that recently the Supreme Court 
has held that the government might retain and use books and papers seized 
by private detectives and turned over to the government as evidence, in a 
prosecution for fraudulent use of the mails, this not being a search and 
seizure by the government itself, but two Justices dissented and pointed out 
that this mode of procedure would not encourage respect for the law and 
the government. Burdeau v. McDowell, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574-
Now if the income from state and municipal bonds is constitutionally 
exempt from federal taxation (as it is), what right has Congress to demand 
a statement of how much that income is? How is such a statement perti-
nent to the federal tax? Constitutional law does not sanction inquisitorial 
invasions of the right to privacy in personal affairs, especially where the 
information demanded cannot change or aid congressional or executive or 
judicial action. The inquiry is for some extraneous purpose, apparently 
curiosity. Even a stockholder cannot examine corporate papers "to gratify 
idle curiosity." Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148. 
A side light is thrown on this subject by the decisions under the Fifth 
Amendment that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." While the limits of search warrants and sub-
poenas duces tecmn are not yet clearly defined, yet illegal practices in searches 
and seizures have been emphatically condemned by the courts of last resort. 
The search and seizure of a man's private papers to obtain evidence to 
recover a penalty or forfeit his property or convict him of a crime is uncon-
stitutional. So also is an Act of Congress authorizing United States courts 
in revenue cases to require the production in court of such private books 
and papers. Boyd v. United State~ n6 U. S. 616, involving a proceeding 
in rem to forfeit certain goods alleged to have been fraudulently imported 
without paying duties. The seizure of the letters and correspondence of an 
accused person in his house during his absence and without his authority 
by a United States marshal, holding no warrant for his arrest or for the 
search of his premises, is unconstitutional and the court will order such 
letters and papers to be returned. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. 
Furthermore, such books and papers cannot be subpoenaed before a grand 
jury, nor copies or photographs of them used as evidence against the accused 
person. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385. In New 
York it is held that a statute which authorizes state officials to enter the 
place of business of an individual and examine all of his books and papers, 
to ascertain whether he has attached state stamps on transfers of stock, 
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violates the constitutional prov1s1on that an individual in a criminal case 
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. People v. Reardon, 
197 N. Y. 236. 
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 369, *304, says (note 1) : 
"The scope of this work does not call for any discussion of the 
searches of private premises, and seizures of books and papers, which 
are made under the authority, or claim of authority, of the revenue 
laws of the United States.,~ Perhaps, under no other laws are such 
liberties taken by ministerial officers ; and it would be surprising to 
find oppressive action on their part so often submitted to without legal 
contest, if the facilities they possess to embarrass, annoy and obstruct 
the merchant in his business were not borne in mind. The federal 
decisions, however, go very far to establish the doctrine that, in mat-
ters of revenue, the regulations Congress sees fit to establish, however 
unreasonable they may seem, must prevail." 
If Judge Cooley were now alive he would see the law vindicated and 
its violations rebuked, as shown by the above decisions. 
Hence it may well be questioned whether the La Follette amendment 
would have been constitutional. It was not to get information for legisla-
tion, inasmuch as Congress cannot levy an income tax on interest from 
state or municipal bonds. It has too remote a bearing upon a possible con-
stitutional amendment, especially as the states will not voluntarily by such 
an amendment increase the rate of interest on their bonds and make the 
federal government a present of that increase; neither will they vote for 
such an amendment unless it is reciprocal and allows them to tax the 
income from federal bonds. 
'J.'he mere fiat of Congress that such information must be given ,\.ould, 
of course, not be conclusive. In the tax case of Eisner v. 11-faccmber, 252 
· U. S. 189, the court said (page 206) : "Congress cannot by any definition it 
may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Con-
stitution, from which alone it derives its power- to legislate, and within 
whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised." 
EVIDENCE-PROOF REQUIRED TO ADMIT BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.-"Now they 
[negotiable instruments] are not goods, nor securities, nor documents for 
debts, nor are so esteemed, but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordi-
nary course and transactions of business, by the general consent of man-
kind, which gives them the credit and currency of money to all intents and 
purposes." Lord Mansfield in Miller v. Race, I Burrows 452. By a process 
something like that by which the negotiability of promissory notes and bills 
uf exchange became recognized in the Jaw of contracts, the rules of evi-
dence seem to be accommodating themselves to the necessities and customs 
of trade. 
"A shop-book was allowed in evidence in indebitatus assumpsit, in a tay-
lor's bill, it being proved that the servant that writ the book was dead, and 
this was his hand, and he accustomed to make the entries, and no proof was 
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required of the delivery of the goods." 12 VIN. ABR. 89. This of course 
applies when the one making the entry had personal knowledge of the trans-
action. The same rule is followed in Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Bass, 
204 Ala. 28. · 
It is when the one making the entry had no personal knowledge of the 
truth of the transactions recorded, but made them from the reports of other 
employees who delivered the goods or performed the services, that the courts 
have experienced difficulties. leading to various rules as to when such 
accounts are admissible. "Evidence of beer delivered was this, the draymen 
came every night to the clerk of the brewhouse, and gave him account of 
the beer they had delivered out, to which the draymen set their hands, and 
that the drayman was dead, but that his hand was set to the book. And 
that was held good evidence of a delivery." Price v. Torrington, 2 Ld. 
Raym. 873. If the transactor is unavailable, dead, insane, or, in some juris-
dictions, permanently in another jurisdiction, the entries are admissible if 
the entrant is able to testify that the entries were made by him in the reg-
ular course of business, and that they are correct reproductions of the 
reports made. There is agreement that these extra-judicial statements are 
admissible because the circumstances of necessity and the guaranty of trust-
worthiness entitle them to be received in evidence as e.."<Cceptions to the hear-
say rule. Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326; Poole v. Dicas, I Bing. N. C. 649. 
There is a type of unavailability which the nature of modern business 
has created. It is that where an entry is made only after a series of trans-
actions, each perhaps requiring the attention of a different employee of the 
party who desires to put the final record, which constitutes the original 
entry, in evidence. The unavailability of those having personal knowledge 
of the several transactions culminating in the items may be said roughly to 
spring from these causes: (I) the transactors are unknown; (2) the trans-
actors are a transient class, often gone when the record is produced in court; 
(3) there is impracticability in taking a number of employees from their 
shop duties to be witnesses. 
In Kent v. Garvin, I Gray (Mass.) 148, the clerk who kept the book 
testified that it was a book of original entries, that the one who delivered 
the goods habitually reported to him from memoranda made at the time, 
and that the witness copied these reports into the book offered in evidence. 
The transactor was absent from the jurisdiction. For the want of his testi-
mony, the books were held inadmissible, the court using this language : 
"It is manifest that an important link in the chain of evidence is wanting. 
The clerk who made the entries had no knowledge of the correctness of any 
charge on the book The case therefore rests on the mere unsupported 
evidence of a third person, whose fidelity and accuracy there are no means 
of ascertaining and testing. It is in its nature mere hearsay testimony." 
It js not enough, then, in the opinion of the Massachusetts court, to show 
that the record was fairly kept under circumstances which naturally would 
make it accurate. This rule is again applied in Delaney v. Framingham 
Gas, Fieel and Power Co., 202 Mass. 359; A.tlas Shoe Co. v. Bloom, 2og 
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Mass. 563; Kaplan v. Gross, 223 Mass. 152. It should be noticed that there 
was not a strong case of unavailability presented in Kent v. Garvin, supra, 
for apparently there were but two employees; also a deposition could have 
been gotten from the absent person. This was not true of Kaplan v. Gross, 
supra, yet the court refused to depart from the precedent. See, too, M a1is-
ficld v. Gieshee (Me., 1921), u4 Atl. 2g6. 
The usual practical impossibility of bringing those persons into court 
from whose personal knowledge and reports another, whose duty it was, 
wrote them in the book of original entries, has induced other courts to lay 
down a still different rule of admissibility for book accounts. It is enough 
in such jurisdictions to show that the account book. offered was made in the 
regular course of business, if the system of making the entries was explained 
and it appeared that accuracy would probably follo\V from it. The elements 
of necessity and trustworthiness-always to be found before extra-judicial 
statements are admissible-were deemed to be present. 
Among the pioneer cases in which this more liberal rule was adopted 
was Givens v. Pierson's Adm%., 167 Ky. 574- The bookkeeper of a large 
establishment testified that as a clerk made a sale he entered it on a ticket, 
from which the witness would copy the transaction on the books. The book· 
keeper had no other knowledge of the transactions; he could say nothing 
as to the correctness of the items made on the tickets by the clerks. To 
admit the books as evidence of the transaction, no other proof was required 
than to show the method used in making them, and to identify them. It 
was immaterial, the court said, whether or not those who m~de the memo-
randa on the tickets could be brought into court to te.stify. The demands 
of modern business for such a rule were expressly stated as causing this 
decision. "And so this change in business methods has made necessary the 
broadening of the rule admitting book entries as substantive evidence, and 
now the test of the admissibility of this class of evidence does not depend 
so much on whether the entry offered in evidence was made on a permanent 
book at the time the transaction actually occurred by the clerk who attended 
to it as it does on the fact that it was made in the usual manner in which 
the business is conducted, although the entry may be made by a person 
whose only information is gained from the tickets furnished him by the 
clerks or other persons who actually attended to the business,'' said the court. 
See also, White Sewing Machine Co. v. Gilmore F1trnitiere· Co., 128 Va. 630; 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. R. R. Commissioners, 86 S. C. 91; Loveman, 
Joseph & Loeb v. McQ1eem, 203 Ala. z8o; Bush v. Ta-y,•lor, 136 Ark. 554; 
Montgomery & 1l11ellen Lmnber Co. v. Ocea1i Park Scenic Ry., 32 Cal. App. 
32. In the last case, the books were allowed in evidence when one who was 
familiar with the method of keeping them testified as to that, and identified 
the books. In Gallatin Co. Farmers' Alliance v. Flamiery, 59 Mont. 534 
this was held to be error, since the bookkeeper was available as a witness. 
The former holding is undoubtedly correct; anyone with knowledge of these 
facts should be allowed to testify to them. 
What may be considered a further liberalization of the rule is found in 
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the late case of Billingsley v. U.S. (C. C. A., 1921), 274 Fed. 86 .. The books 
were identified by the witness Levy, who assisted in keeping them; this wit-
ness also acted as a salesman and testified that he had sold goods to the 
defendants. But it does not appear that he had any personal knowledge that 
the goods entered in the books had been delivered to the defendant. He 
also said that the books were kept in the regular course of business. The 
court said: "These books were properly kept * * * in the regular course 
of business by a person employed for that purpose. It was wholly unimpor-
tant whether the witness Levy made any or all the entries therein or not, 
and equally unimportant whether or not he had any recollection in reference 
to particular sales." The requirement here is less than that of cases fol-
lowing Give1is v. Pierson's Adm.z-., supra, in that no description of the method 
of keeping the books was required. This should be demanded by the courts. 
There is a possibility that under such a lenient rule of admissibility as in 
the Billingsley case self-serving documents may be introduced in evidence. 
Compelling the party offering the book to explain the system by which it is 
kept places no unreasonable burden upon him and at the same time affords 
the court a fair opportunity of deciding upon the trustworthiness of the book. 
The courts in the main have met a changed situation well, and in 
changing a rule of evidence to meet altered circumstances have made a 
concrete application of the words of Chief Justice Shaw in Norway Plains 
Co. v. B. & M. R. R. Co., I Gray (Mass.) 263: "It is one of the great 
merits and advantages of the common law that instead of a series of detailed 
practical rules*** the common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive' 
principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy, 
modified ~nd adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases which 
fall within it. * * * When new practices spring up, new combinations of fact 
arise, and cases are presented for which there is no precedent in judicial 
decision, they must be governed by the general principle applicable to cases 
most nearly analogous, but modified and adapted to new circumstances by 
considerations of fitness and propriety, of reason and justice, which grow 
out of these circumstances." G. E. L. 
MARITIMF: LAW-PERSONALITY OF SHIP-Izu11rnNITY oF GoVSRNMSN'l'I 
PRoPSRTY.-The recent opinions of the Supreme Court in the three cases 
of the Western Maid, Liberty, and Carolinia1i (U. S. Sup. Ct., January 3, 
1922) emphasize the non-liability of national ships in cases of collision. 
'fhe W estem 11-faid, owned by the United States and manned by the navy, 
was in collision in New York harbor. The Liberty was a pilot boat under 
charter to the government and had a collision in the harbor of Boston. 
The Carolinian, also a chartered ship, had done similar damage in Brest, 
France. The two latter had been re-delivered to the owners, and the former 
to the U. S. Shipping Board, when the libels were filed, so that the process 
in no way interfered with the possession of the sovereign. In each case the 
Supreme Court issued its extraordinary writ of prohibition to prevent dis-
trict courts from exercising jurisdiction. 
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It had been the general opinion that ships of the government incurred 
the same liabilty as those of individuals on account of maritime transactions, 
although that liability might not be enforced where it would be necessary 
to take the res out of the possession of the government by any writ or 
process of the court. Davis, IO Wall. 15. The practice prevailed, to some 
extent at least, of filing a libel in rem, without the prayer for process, and 
requesting an appearance on behalf of the United States, in analogy with 
the English practice! described in The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, I54- The existence 
of the maritime lien was assumed and suits in rem have been frequent, 
subject to the rule that property of the government might not be attached 
unless it could be done without disturbing the possession of the United 
States. Thus the books contain suits for general average, U. S. v. Wilder, 
3 Sumner 3o8; salvage, U. S. v. Morg01i, 99 Fed. 572; sailor's wages, St. 
Jago de C11ba, 9 Wheat 409; and material-men's claims, Rev. C1ttter No. I, 
Brown's Admiralty 76. All cases of this nature pre-suppose the existence 
of a maritime lien, inherent in the res itself. If the government consented 
to the suit, or if the suit could be prosecuted without disturbing its posses-
sion, the lien was enforced as in ordinary cases. The present cases, how-
ever, proceed on the negation of the lien itself, "Legal obligations that exist 
but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law, but that are 
elusive to the grasp." The result would seem to be that henceforward 
there can be no proceeding in rem against property which was in the pos-
session of the United States at the time the cause of action accrued. Unless 
a maritime lien arises out of the transaction itself, admiralty jurisdiction 
in rem is unthinkable, for such liens· are not created by subsequent agree-
ments. _Nothing subsequent may supply an original lack of vitality. It is 
difficult to reconcile the decision with the Siren, S1tpra, the Davis, IO Wall 
15, and U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. 
The brilliant writer of the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes, 
answered the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? by "The 
prophecies of what the courts will -do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, 
are what I mean by the law" (Collected Legai Papers, 173). In the same 
address, the body of reports, treatises and statutes are called "the sybilline 
leaves in which are gathered the scattered prophecies of the past upon the 
cases in which the axe will fall." The metaphor is a striking one; according 
to Vergil (ZE11eid, III, 452), the Sibyl wrote her prophecies on the leaves of 
trees and so arranged them within the cave that the approach of inquirers 
blew them into such confusion that their meaning became incomprehensible, 
-inconS1tlti abemit sedemque odere Sibyllae. The line will fit more than 
one admiralty practitioner whose clients are asking opinions about cargoes, 
for instance, lost in a collision between a car-ferry operated by the Director-
General of Railroads and a Navy transport allocated to the Shipping Board. 
The goal of the law is stability in fundamentals and the maritime law has 
enough reports and treatises and statutes to furnish a more substantial 
foundation than foliage, but its students are finding more truth than poetry 
in the metaphor. This will be more evident if the decision indicates a modi-
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fication of the underlying doctrine of the personality of the ship. The 
minority of the court, in a vigorous dissent, would seem apprehensive of 
this result. Such a consequence would be unfortunate. The basis of 
admiralty jurisdiction, and the only reason. for not blending it with the 
common Jaw, is its proceeding in rem, and that proceeding depends on the 
theory of maritime liens, which, in itself, rests upon the individuality of the 
ship. From the standpoint of business, the ship -cannot sail without credit 
and it cannot have credit without maritime liens. These are f;miliar plati-
tudes, but they are derived from the inherent nature of the business itself. 
Another is that capital cannot be secured for the business unless the investor 
can be assured of a definite limitation of liability, and this ultimately depends 
upon the personification of the ship. Tradesmen will not furnish a ship 
with supplies nor salvors aid her in peril unless they have the assurance of 
the lien. The importance of the lien is quite as important in matters of tort, 
although not as conspicuous, since, for example, it is one of the elements 
of the underwriter's rate of premium for the running-down clause in the 
marine policy. At a time when we are making a colossal effort to establish 
a mercantile marine, with ships publicly, and not privately, owned, it will 
be unfortunate to impair their credit and segregate them further from the 
settled channels of the general maritime law. The majority opinion, it is 
true, warns us that "we must realize that however ancient may be the tradi-
tions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been 
drawn, it derives its whole and only power in· this country from its having 
been accepted and atlopted by the United States. There is no mystic over-
law to which even the United States must bow." There is, however, a very 
plain and definite law, to which even the United States must bow if it is 
to succeed in maritime affairs, and that is the general maritime law, or 
common law of the sea, and the established practices and requirements of 
the business. G. L. C. 
MARITIMS LAW-SHIP UNDER CoNS'l'RUC'tION-WoRKMAN's CoMPENSAnoN. 
-In Ship Compaiiy v. Rhode (U. S. Sup. Ct., January 3, 1922) the Supreme 
Court reaffirms the rule that locality is the test of admiralty jurisdiction in 
matters of tort, even if the injury was received upon a ship in the process 
of construction, so long as it was afloat. The tort was consummated upon 
navigable waters; that satisfies the criterion. The fact that the ship was 
not yet within the jurisdiction (because of the ship-building dogma) is imma-
terial ; locality controls. 
The second question was whether the e..'Cclusive features of the Oregon 
Workmen's Compensation Act abrogated the right to recover damages in 
admiralty. That act entitles the injured workman to receive specific pay-
ments and provides that "the right to receive such sums shall be in lieu of 
all claims against his employer." In the present case the workman had sued 
the employer in admiralty, and the Oregon statute is held to preclude the 
su'it because it prescribes an exclusive remedy for the injury involved. It 
is generally held that what is a discharge of a debt in the country where it 
is contracted is a discharge of it everywhere, and that where an obligation 
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ex delicto to pay damages is discharged and avoided by the law of the 
country where it was made, the accessory right of action is in like manner 
discharged and avoided. Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1. Under this rule, 
the state statute would control in all non-maritime transactions, because the 
parties had contracted with reference to it. The construction of a ship is 
no different from the construction of a house, so far as the Compensation 
Act is concerned, and where the injured party comes into' a court of another 
jurisdiction his rights are measured by the lex lows delicti. G. L. C. 
THE "HoT TRAIL'' IN'.i.'O Msx1co AND ExTRADI'.i.'ION ANALOGms.~The 
recent decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Doming11ez v. 
State, 234 S. W. 79, has given us an important precedent and also a valuable 
example of the solution of novel problems by means of analogies. A detach-
ment of the military forces of the United States had been authorized by the 
War Department to enter Mexico on the "hot trail" in pursuit of bandits. 
While following a "hot trail" this detachment arrested Dominguez, a native 
citizen and resident of Mexico, and returned with him to the United States. 
It developed later that he was not one of the bandits who made the "hot 
trail." Dominguez was thereupon turned over, without his consent, to the 
authorities of Texas, and was indicted and convicted for a murder previously 
committed in Texas. It was held upon appeal that the prisoner might resist 
trial for the offense charged in the indictment until such time as he should 
voluntarily subject himself to the jurisdiction of the United States or until 
the consent of the Mexican government to his trial should be obtained. 
There was no precedent in the decided cases. Counsel argued for the 
application by analogy of the principles which control in the decision of 
extradition cases. In reliance upon the extradition analogies the case was 
decided. 
In general, apart from treaty, independent states are said to be under 
no international obligation to surrender fugitives from justice. HYDS, INT. 
LAW, I, § 3n; Mooru;, DIGSST, IV, 245; MooRS, EXTRADITION, I. 21 ff. The 
facility with which criminals may find asylum i11 other countries has led 
most states to conclude treaties in which provision is made for the extra-
dition of fugitives charged with any one or more of an enumerated list of 
crimes. See the Extradition Treaty with Mexico of 1899, art. 2, and the 
Supplementary Extradition Convention of 1903, MALLOY, TRSATISS, I, n84, 
n93. See also HYDS, I, §§ 313 ff. The extradition of fugitives is thus a 
concession and compromise defined in treaties, a mitigation of strict right 
in the common interest of all civilized states. Comity and good faith among 
nations require that the concession should not be overtaxed or abused. It 
follows, according to the rule; generally approved, and expressly affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, that "a person who has been 
brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under 
an extradition treaty. can only be tried for one of the offenses described in 
that treaty, and for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings 
for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given 
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him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country 
from whose asylum he has been forcibly taken under those proceedings." 
United States v. Rauscher, n9 U. S. 407, 430. See HYDE, I, § 322; Mooim, 
EXTRADITION, I, 2I9 ff. See also Johnson v. Browne, 205 U. S. 309. Compare 
Collins v. O'Neil, 2I4 U. S. n3. 
While the rule of the Rauscher case has frequently been so stated as to 
emphasize the extradited prisoner's right to resist trial upon any other 
charge than the one upon which he was extradited, it is submitted that the 
prisoner's right is only incidental and a convenient safeguard against the 
possibility that the confidence of the state of asylum may be abused. See 
United Stai es v. Ra11scher, n9 U. S. 407, 4I9-22; Ker v. Illinois, II9 U. S. 
436, 443; MooR.E, EXTRADITION, II. 1042. This analysis finds strong support 
in the circumstance that the rule of the Rauscher case does not apply 
between the several states of the United States where considerations of 
international comity and good faith are not involved. Lascelles v. Georgia, 
148 ·u. S. 537; Mooim, EXTRADITION, II, 1035 ff. See 20 MICH. L. Riw. 
449. It is further supported by the circumstance that the rule does not 
apply where the prisoner has been abducted or kidnapped from the state of 
asylunL See Ker v. Illinois, II9 U. S. 436, decided at the same time as the 
Rauscher case. HYDE, I, § 321 ; Mooim, EXTRADITION, I, 294 ff. The abduc-
tion or kidnapping, as in the Ker case, is a violation of jurisdiction of 
which the asylum state may justly complain; but it seems clear that the 
recognition of a right in the prisoner to resist trial, so far from operating 
to prevent a breach of faitl:~ between nations or to afford the affronted state 
adequate satisfaction, would only add insult to injury. 
If the prisoner is regularly extradited, therefore, as in the Rauscher 
case, he may be tried only for the offense for which he is extradited; but 
if he is kidnapped, as in the Ker case, considerations of international comity 
and good faith afford him no protection. Of these two rules, entirely con-
sistent if the reasons therefor are understood, which is the better suited to 
the novel situation presented in Dominguez v. State? Viewing the situation 
superficially, an analogy with the Ker case would have been more plausible. 
Inasmuch, however, as the pursuit and arrest of bandits in Mexico without 
the consent of the Mexican government would have been a gross violation 
of Mexican jurisdiction, the Court indulged the presumption-with entire 
propriety, it is submitted-that instructions from the War Department to 
follow the "hot trail" were issued pursuant to some kind of agreement with 
Mexico. This presumption brought the case within the reason and hence 
within the rule of United States v. Rauscher'. Considerations of interna-
tional comity and good faith are quite as important in case of the pursuit 
and capture of bandits pursuant to agreement as in case of extradition 
under treaty. Had one of the bandits pursued been captured, he should not 
have been tried for any other offense than that which started the "hot trail." 
No greater right was acquired as regards Dominguez, who was wrongly 
arrested on the mistaken assumption that he was one of the bandits pursued. 
E.D.D. 
